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Abstract
Political parties are a crucial link between the public and policy outcomes. However, few studies have considered who
political parties are responsive to when they take positions on specific policy proposals. This article explores the links
between public opinion and the policy positions of political parties on 102 specific policy proposals in Germany using a
novel application of multilevel regression with poststratification to estimate the policy preferences of party supporters.
While there is a link between general public preferences and the positions of political parties, this connection weakens
considerably once political parties are in government. In fact, the study shows that the link between party positions and
general public opinion is severed once parties enter government, whereas it is only weakened in the case of party
supporters. Finally, the article finds mixed evidence for differences between niche parties and mainstream parties.
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Introduction
In many normative definitions of democratic systems,
political parties are expected to represent their voters and
pursue the policies they promised to deliver (e.g. Mair,
2008) to ensure a link between the preferences of the public
and policy outcomes (Dahl, 1956). It is thus unsurprising
that a literature has emerged studying who political parties
represent when they take policy positions.1 One influential
strand of literature argues that niche parties are different to
mainstream parties, because mainstream parties seeking to
maximize their vote share will cater to the median voter,
whereas niche parties that are more policy-seeking will
respond to the preferences of their supporters (e.g. Adams
et al., 2006). Recently, scholars have also argued that polit-
ical parties in government are constrained by coalition
agreements and their responsibility to implement election
promises. This means that unlike parties in opposition, they
are less able to respond to the issue priorities of the public
(Klu¨ver and Spoon, 2016).
Such studies of party positions tend to study left–right or
other policy dimensions like Europeanization. They have
yielded many valuable insights but are not directly aimed at
understanding how political parties make decisions on con-
crete policy issues. Yet it is these specific policy issues like
whether the pension age should be raised or extending more
rights to same-sex couples that end up affecting the lives of
citizens. There is also evidence that public preferences on
specific policy issues are not strongly linked to the public’s
positions on dimensions, indicating that studying specific
issues is a valuable addition to the field (Lesschaeve, 2017).
Studies on the link between public opinion and policy
outputs have studied specific policy issues (e.g. Gilens,
2012; Lax and Phillips, 2012), allowing them to comple-
ment findings from previous studies that considered policy
scales (e.g. Stimson et al., 1995). Although the approach
has its drawbacks, it is increasingly propagated because it
provides insights into the concrete policies that are deliv-
ered to citizens and ensures a direct match between public
preferences and policy (Wlezien, 2016).
This article contributes to both the literature on the pub-
lic–party and the public–policy linkages by exploring the
link between public opinion and political parties on specific
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policy issues. It considers whether the policy positions of
political parties are related to the preferences of the general
public or their supporters, and whether this relationship is
dependent on whether a party is a niche or mainstream
party and in or out of government.
To do this, the study assesses the positions of political
parties in the German Bundestag on 102 specific policy
proposals in the period between 1998 and 2010. The issues
concern possible policy changes like raising the taxes on
petrol or increasing the size of the German military deploy-
ment in Afghanistan. The article records statements by
political parties about these policy issues in two major
newspapers to investigate whether the preferences of the
general public and party supporters are represented in these
claims.
This study complements the existing methods of mea-
suring the preferences of party supporters through an inno-
vative application of multilevel regression with
poststratification (MRP) to individual survey responses.
This method fits multilevel models to predict support
among different subgroups of party supporters and then
weights these predictions to obtain a final estimate (Lax
and Phillips, 2012). The approach helps address concerns
about small sample sizes for supporters of the smaller polit-
ical parties.
The results show that there is a link between public
preferences and the positions of political parties. However,
the article finds little evidence for the expected differences
between niche and mainstream parties. The analysis indi-
cates that the link between public preferences and party
positions disappears once parties enter government,
whereas the link with the preferences of party supporters
is weakened but not severed. The study thus contributes to
the literature on policy and party representation and illus-
trates the advantages of studying specific policy issues.
Policy outcomes and representation of the public
While there is disagreement over how the preferences of the
public should be taken into account by politicians in dem-
ocratic systems (Mansbridge, 2003), there is more agree-
ment that there ought to be a general connection between
what the public wants and what it gets in democracies
(Dahl, 1956). Even if it may not be desirable that public
opinion influences all policies, like the rights or protection
of minorities, there is a long tradition of studies investigat-
ing this link between public preferences and policy (for
reviews, see Burstein, 2014; Wlezien, 2016).
Early studies argued that policy was often in line with
public opinion (Monroe, 1979) and that policies shifted in
line with changes in public preferences (Page and Shapiro,
1983). By moving toward designs that measured public
preferences and policy on a common scale, later scholars
could study public opinion over time and found strong links
with policy (Stimson et al., 1995). Moreover, Wlezien
(1995) demonstrates that public preferences and levels of
spending react to one another—even if the relationship is
conditioned by institutional factors (Wlezien and Soroka,
2012).
However, some studies argue that the ties between pol-
icy and the public are not that strong. Gilens (2012) shows
that policy in the United States is more responsive to the
preferences of the wealthy than to those of the poor. This
study faces criticism for not distinguishing between the
preferences of the poor and the rich—and overlooking the
fact that policy changed in line with the preferences of
the rich and those of the poor in equal measure when the
two disagreed (Branham et al., 2017). However, another
study focusing on Europe and employing different methods
finds results similar to those of Gilens (Peters and Ensink,
2015). Even if the jury is still out concerning whether pol-
icy outcomes reflect the preferences of the public, it is
important to consider the mechanisms through which this
connection may (not) come about. Existing studies do
cover some of these and have argued that the saliency of
policy issues (Lax and Phillips, 2012), institutions (Wle-
zien and Soroka, 2012), and interest groups (Gilens, 2012;
Lax and Phillips, 2012) may matter in this regard. How-
ever, these studies have paid scant attention to the role of
political parties, even if these act as important intermedi-
aries between the public and policy outcomes.
Political parties and representation of the public
In parallel to these studies, there is an extensive literature
that considers the role of political parties in representing
the public. Through elections political parties are argued to
obtain a mandate to represent their voters, which should
ensure a connection between public opinion and policy
(Mair, 2008). Numerous studies investigate these links
between political parties and the public on left–right and
other ideological dimensions and generally find a link
between party positions and public opinion (for a review,
see Fagerholm, 2015). This work argues that parties have
strategic reasons to respond to public preferences but that
they are constrained by both party characteristics and exter-
nal conditions.
Public preferences and policy positions are usually mea-
sured on left–right scales. Recently, authors have started to
study more concrete dimensions (like immigration or envi-
ronmental policy), furthering our understanding of how
these affect both the policy positions of political parties
(Dalton, 2017) and their attention to policy issues (e.g.
Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014; Klu¨ver and Spoon, 2016).
Some studies employing policy dimensions may have the
drawback that they measure the consistency of public pre-
ferences as opposed to ideological positions (Broockman,
2016): Especially when scales are constructed from the
preferences of citizens on specific policy issues, a citizen
who holds extreme views in two directions will be rated as
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moderate. However, more consistent elite actors like the
leaders of political parties will be rated as more extreme
because their preferences consistently fall on one side of
the scale. This becomes problematic when comparing the
distance between public preferences and those of elite
actors. To address this, the following section outlines an
exploratory theoretical framework on how political parties
take public preferences into account when deciding upon
specific policy issues.
Theorizing the positions of political parties on specific
policy issues
Apart from addressing potential methodological problems,
a focus on specific issues also matters because these are the
policies that end up affecting the lives of citizens. There are
theoretical reasons to expect that political parties will
indeed aim to represent (parts of) the public. Parties are
often assumed to be office-seeking actors who seek to max-
imize their vote share (Riker, 1962). While they may pur-
sue other goals (such as policy change), these are not
mutually exclusive and will often overlap (Spoon and Klu¨-
ver, 2014; Strom and Mu¨ller, 1999). Generally, politicians
in political parties will, at least partially, be driven by a
desire to get (re)elected and are expected to pursue policies
that are popular with their supporters or the general electo-
rate (Stimson et al., 1995). If a specific policy is popular
among the general public, then, all else being equal, polit-
ical parties will prefer to take a position that is in line with
these public preferences. Hence, the first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the public support for a spe-
cific policy issue, the more likely that a political party
takes a position in favor of the specific policy issue.
Moreover, different parties may be inclined to relate dif-
ferently to parts of the public. One relevant party character-
istic concerns the distinction between niche parties and
mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005), and scholars have
argued that they act differently in a number of ways (e.g.
Adams et al., 2006; Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014). Based on
the idea of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996), Meguid (2005)
defined niche parties as those that reject the class-based
orientation of politics, emphasize new issues that do not
coincide with the traditional left–right division, and focus
on a narrow set of issues. Similarly, Wagner (2012) postu-
lates that niche parties compete on a few noneconomic issues
and that the “nicheness” of a political party is a matter of
degree rather than a dichotomous choice. Both definitions
have been critiqued for excluding economic issues, because
a party can emphasize “niche” economic topics and because
mainstream parties can also choose to emphasize typical
niche issues like the environment or immigration (Meyer
and Miller, 2015). Meyer and Miller (2015) and Bischof
(2017a) have relaxed this definition and define a niche party
as a party that emphasizes other policy areas than its com-
petitors and consider nicheness as a matter of degree. These
authors posit that the “nicheness” of a political party is
related to its issue profile. A party’s nicheness depends on
the extent to which it emphasizes issues that other political
parties do not. Because parties can change their issue offers
over time, their nicheness can vary. An example would be a
Green party that enters parliament heavily emphasizing
environmental issues. If it is the only party emphasizing the
issue, this means that its issue emphasis gives it a strong
“niche” issue profile. However, if other political parties start
to pay more attention to the environment, or if the environ-
mental party starts competing on economic issues, its issue
profile becomes more like that of other parties and the party
becomes more mainstream. This thus addresses the concern
that niche parties may become more mainstream, while
mainstream parties may adopt “niche” issues in response
to the rise of niche parties (Bischof, 2017a; Meguid, 2005;
Meyer and Miller, 2015). In contrast to previous studies, this
study adopts the continuous definition of Bischof (2017a).
Turning to the public opinion–party position linkage, the
argument in previous studies (using a dichotomous defini-
tion) is that mainstream parties are driven by vote and
office-seeking goals and respond to shifts in preferences
on a left–right scale of the median voter. On the other hand,
niche parties are more policy-seeking and more responsive
to shifts in preferences of their core party supporters
(Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011). This expectation
can be translated to specific policy issues: Mainstream par-
ties take issue positions in line with the preferences of the
general public and niche parties take positions in line with
the preferences of their supporters.
Recent studies have refined this claim and argue that
niche parties are only more responsive to the issue priori-
ties of their supporters on issue dimensions that they own
(Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014; Klu¨ver and Spoon, 2016).
However, it is less clear whether such theories of issue
ownership apply to the level of specific policy issues. Even
if a policy area or dimension is owned by a party, this does
not necessarily mean it is associated with a specific pro-
posal in the area. As an example, a Green party may gen-
erally “own” environmental issues, but another party may
be associated with a specific plan to store emitted carbon
dioxide underground. Still, Online Appendix 5 outlines a
discussion and test of this argument regarding niche parties
and issue ownership. Summarizing, and taking into account
the continuous conceptualization of nicheness, the follow-
ing hypotheses can be derived:
Hypothesis 2A: The policy positions of a more main-
stream political party on specific policy issues are more
likely to be positively related to the preferences of the
general public than those of a more niche party.
Hypothesis 2B: The policy positions of a more niche
party on specific policy issues are more likely to be
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positively related to the preferences of their supporters
than those of a more mainstream party.
Even if political parties generally aim to take popular
positions on issues, they face constraints regarding the pol-
icy positions that they can take. One such constraint is
participation in government, and Klu¨ver and Spoon
(2016) argue that government parties are indeed less
responsive to the issue priorities of the public than opposi-
tion parties. They claim that government parties are less
able to emphasize the issues voters find important, because
they are held more accountable for the implementation of
their campaign promises than opposition parties and thus
have less room to maneuver.
Moreover, there are good reasons to expect that political
parties in government are more restrained than those in
opposition regarding the policy positions they can take.
Firstly, the need to agree with coalition partners on an issue
constrains a party’s ability to choose a position that is pop-
ular among either the public or its supporters. Secondly and
unlike opposition parties, parties in government have to
directly take into account constraints like the government
budget and international commitments and are thus more
limited in the positions they can take. Finally, parties some-
times blur their positions, for example, when their policy
position is unpopular with the public (Rovny, 2012). Trans-
lating this to a specific issue like raising the retirement age,
it is likely that government parties will be put under more
pressure (e.g. by opposition parties) to take a position on
the issue as they are responsible for its implementation,
especially once it comes on the political agenda (Green
Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). So, where opposition par-
ties may be able to avoid declaring their unpopular posi-
tions, government parties have less opportunity to do so.
This should limit the ability of a party in government to
take policy positions that are related to the preferences of
both the general public and their supporters leading to the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3A: The policy positions of a government
party on specific policy issues are less likely to be
related to the preferences of the general public than the
positions of an opposition party.
Hypothesis 3B: The policy positions of a government
party on specific policy issues are less likely to be
related to the preferences of its supporters than the posi-
tion of an opposition party.
Research design
The relationship between political parties and public opinion.
Because specific policy issues are different to the scales
that are normally used in the literature on the public opin-
ion–party position linkage, this study adopts a different
approach than is often used in this literature. Instead, it
draws on studies of the link between public opinion and
policy outcomes (Lax and Phillips, 2012).2 In this defini-
tion of the linkage, one cannot say that a single party posi-
tion is “related” to public opinion but rather that the
positions of a political party are linked to public prefer-
ences in general—meaning that the party is more likely
to support a policy the more the public supports it. This
definition does not assume a causal link between public
preferences and party positions but is more agnostic regard-
ing whether political parties are influenced by public pre-
ferences, or vice versa. This differs from the general
approach in the literature on political parties, where the
relationship is called responsiveness and defined as a posi-
tional shift by a political party in response to a change in
public opinion (e.g. Adams et al., 2006). Finally, the anal-
yses also consider whether the results are robust to oper-
ationalizing the linkage as congruence, which is achieved
when a political party takes a position that is in line (con-
gruent) with the majority of either its own supporters or the
general public on an issue (for the same definition regard-
ing policy outcomes instead of party positions, see Lax and
Phillips, 2012).
Case selection. This study focuses on Germany for a number
of reasons. Firstly, it is one of few countries for which
enough high-quality survey data are available for many
policy issues that could also be disaggregated to allow for
the estimation of the preferences of party supporters. More-
over, the biweekly German Politbarometer can be lever-
aged for the approximation of the demographic profile of
party supporters in a given year, which is a prerequisite for
the expansion of MRP used in this article.
Focusing on Germany has the added benefit of keeping
institutional and other country-level variables that may
affect the public opinion–party linkage constant. The coun-
try can be regarded as a typical case for studying the pub-
lic–party linkage in (West) European countries with
proportional or mixed electoral systems for several reasons
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008). For one, the parties that are
in parliament are all of major party families, and many
(Western) European countries have similar parties and pat-
terns of party competition. Moreover, during the observa-
tion period, which runs from 1998 to 2010, the composition
of government coalitions varied and covered left-wing,
right-wing, and broad coalitions meaning that four of the
five political parties in the country were in government at
some point. The German case thus covers all kinds of gov-
ernment coalitions in proportional or mixed electoral sys-
tems, except for minority coalitions, which strengthens the
inferences about the effect of being part of government.
In addition, the levels of party discipline are comparable
to Western European countries, especially within the Bun-
destag (Brettschneider, 1996; Sieberer, 2006). This means
that the assumption in this study that the politicians from
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the same party in the Bundestag tend to be or present them-
selves as unified on most policy issues should hold.
The policy issues are selected from the high-quality
Politbarometer surveys that were held across a stratified
random sample of the German population between 1998
and 2010. For a policy item to be included in the study, it
has to meet three criteria. Firstly, it has to be about a spe-
cific policy proposal. Secondly, the policy issue has to fall
under the national jurisdiction so that national political
parties can reasonably be assumed to engage with the issue.
Thirdly, the answer has to be measured on an agreement
scale. A total number of 102 policy issues meet these cri-
teria and cover topics like the construction of a Holocaust
memorial in Berlin and whether German soldiers should be
withdrawn from Afghanistan. Online Appendix 7 provides
an overview of all issues.3 An advantage of this selection
strategy is that it also includes issues that never make it
onto the legislative agenda (Gilens, 2012).
Sampling issues from opinion polls means that these
issues do not constitute a completely random sample of a
potential universe of all policy issues, because the sampled
issues will be more salient (Burstein, 2014). However, it is
necessary that citizens have at least somewhat informed
opinions if we expect political parties to engage with these
preferences, rendering the oversampling of somewhat sali-
ent issues less problematic (Gilens, 2012, 50–56).
Estimating parties’ policy preferences. There is extensive
debate about measuring party positions on specific policy
issues (e.g. Gemenis, 2013). This study relies on claims that
representatives from political parties make about issues in
two major newspapers (the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ) and the Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)).4 These newspa-
pers are on the right (FAZ) and left (SZ) side of the political
spectrum. Although there is evidence that their political
orientation does not steer the choice of topics (i.e. the like-
lihood covering an issue), there is variation in how these
papers discuss political actors (Ku¨hne, 2011). So, it is
important to code both newspapers to increase the likeli-
hood that all party positions are covered. Student coders
recorded each statement by representatives of the political
party for a 4-year period after public opinion was measured
or until a policy change was implemented (Gilens, 2012).
Statements were coded as in favor of, neutral, or against the
policy proposal. The final analysis excluded neutral posi-
tions. If multiple positions were found, all were recorded,
and the statement closest to the date of the poll was used in
the analysis, but conflicting statements on the same issue
from the same party were rare.
Of course parties may vote differently on issues than
they claim in the media or take other positions in their
election manifestos. Yet, especially in a country where
internal party discipline is high, one can expect that state-
ments in the media do reflect the unified party’s position
(Brettschneider, 1996), and there is evidence that European
political parties do “walk like they talk” on nuclear policy
(Bischof, 2017b). Moreover, other methods like manifestos
or voting in the Bundestag are not feasible for measuring
the positions of political parties on this predefined set of
issues, because most were not mentioned in party manifes-
tos or voted on. Even though media coding provides the
best coverage of party positions, eight issues in the data set
received so little media coverage that no party positions
were found, meaning that the final models include 94 pol-
icy issues. Policy positions were found for 72% of all 510
possible issue–party combinations (the positions of 5 polit-
ical parties on 102 issues). Coverage was lower for smaller
parties and issues that received less attention in the media,
which is why the analyses control for party size and the
media salience of an issue.
Estimating the preferences of the public and party supporters
using MRP. To measure general public support for a policy
change, this study relies on the Politbarometer. To estimate
the preferences of the supporters of a specific party, how-
ever, a novel application of MRP was used. MRP was
developed to improve the estimates for smaller subgroups
of the population in survey research (Kastellec et al., 2010;
Park et al., 2006). It has been shown to be especially effec-
tive in providing accurate estimates of public opinion when
compared with disaggregation (Lax and Phillips, 2009).
The method uses a multilevel model employing several
demographic categories to obtain predicted support for a
policy issue for each demographic cell in the data.5 Census
data are then used to weight each cell to obtain a represen-
tative prediction. The advantage is that the multilevel mod-
els use more data than just that in the specific cell, leading
to better estimates when there are few observations in spe-
cific subgroups—like the supporters of smaller parties.
The Politbarometer surveys have an average sample size
of around 1500. To estimate the level of support for the
policy issue among supporters of a party, one would ideally
know the demographic composition of the supporters of a
party in a given year. Because such data are unavailable,
this study pools all observations from the biweekly Polit-
barometer in a year to obtain a large annual and nationally
representative sample. This pooled annual data set is used
to estimate the demographic composition of the supporters
of a party in terms of age, gender, and education level—the
same variables used by the regular Politbarometer weights.
Two survey questions are combined to identify party sup-
porters. The first asks whether a respondent generally and
in the long term tends to support a political party. Respon-
dents who indicated they support a specific party were then
asked how strongly they support that party on a five-point
scale. Those who respond 3 (somewhat) through 5 (strong)
are coded as party supporters.6 For each issue, multilevel
models are then run to predict support for each cell that
intersects gender, age (10 categories), education (4 cate-
gories), and party support. These estimates are weighted
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to obtain estimates of support for an issue among a party’s
supporters. This method allows the estimation of the com-
position of party supporters on an annual basis, which is an
advantage over other sources like election surveys.
Measurement of other variables. Following Bischof (2017a),
the nicheness of political parties is established through the
coding of party programs by the Comparative Manifestos
Project (Volkens et al., 2017). This definition considers
nicheness as a matter of degree rather than a dichotomous
distinction. The extent to which a party uniquely focuses on
niche topics in an election manifesto is used as the basis of
the definition. The nicheness of a party can thus vary from
election to election, based on its issue emphasis. The mea-
sure combines two components: The first is the extent to
which a party emphasizes niche topics (the environment,
Euroscepticism, radical right sentiment, agrarianism, and
regionalism) in its party manifestos (measured as the per-
centage of all quasi-sentences in the manifesto dedicated to
these topics). These topics are selected because they meet
three criteria. Firstly, they were located at the periphery of
the party system at some point in many European countries.
Secondly, they could and in some cases have been used to
destabilize traditional left–right competition between polit-
ical parties. Thirdly, all five topics are noneconomic in
nature and thus concern competition on another dimension
than the main economic right–left dimension (Bischof,
2017a: 225). Scholars working on issue ownership have
described the environment as a valence issue, arguing that
parties tend to take similar positions on the issue (i.e. no
party wants to damage the environment) (Budge, 2001;
Van der Brug, 2004). However, the conceptualization of
niche topics used here focuses issue emphasis rather than
position, meaning that it is compatible with the idea of
competition on issue ownership. In addition, the issues of
Euroscepticism and the environment may have become less
“niche” over the 1998–2010 period.
To address this, the second part of the measure indicates
the degree to which the party’s emphasis on these issues is
unique to the party. In other words, this component mea-
sures whether the party emphasizes issues that its compet-
itors do not focus on. As an example, this means that a
party’s focus on Euroscepticism counts relatively less
toward its nicheness when other parties start to emphasize
the issues more. Based on this definition, the nicheness of a
party can thus vary between elections. The combination of
these two factors provides an estimate of the nicheness of a
political party on a scale with higher values indicating a
higher nicheness score (for technical details, see Bischof,
2017a). The score derived from a given manifesto is then
assigned to all statements made during the year before the
election for which the manifesto was written (as this is
the period during which it was written) until a year before
the previous election. The final continuous measure thus
indicates the degree of nicheness of a party at an election.
Averaged across elections within parties during the obser-
vation period, the measure indicates that Die Gru¨ne and Die
Linke focus most on niche topics (relative to other parties),
with CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD having (somewhat) more
mainstream profiles. Although the nicheness of these par-
ties varies from election to election and is measured as a
matter of degree, the Greens and Die Linke would also be
the two German parties that Adams et al. (2006) would rate
as niche parties—giving face validity to the new measure.
The government status of a party is a binary variable that
indicates whether the political party was in government
when the statement indicating the party’s position was
made.
Studies on the public opinion–party position linkage
also include other factors. As an example, political parties
that are organized in a way that gives more power to their
members are more responsive to their supporters, whereas
more leadership-driven parties tend to respond more to the
median voter (Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013).
These alternative explanations are important and because
most vary at the party level, the analyses include dummies
for political parties. The control variable of the media sal-
ience of a policy issue was measured as the average number
of articles per day about issue in the observation period in
the SZ (see Online Appendix 5). Finally, party size is the
percentage of seats a party had in the Bundestag when
the statement about the issue was made. An overview of
the variables is provided in Table 1.
Modeling strategy. The final unit of analysis is a political
party on an issue. Online Appendix 2 shows the structure
of the stacked data set for two hypothetical policy issues.
The observations are nested in political parties and policy
issues. That is why all models are run with random inter-
cepts for issues and fixed effects for parties. Because the
observations may also be clustered in government coali-
tions, the models contain fixed effects indicating whether
the party was a member of any of the coalitions that
occurred during the observation period. Effectively, this
should control for any effects that were specific to a coali-
tion.7 It should be noted that the preferences of the public
and those of the supporters of a specific party on an issue
are highly correlated (0.82) and cannot be included in the
same model.8 Instead, separate models are run for the gen-
eral public and party supporters. Results are shown for
models predicting the former, whereas those for the latter
are included in Online Appendix 3. Where the results dif-
fer, this is noted in the text. The correlation between the
preferences of the public and those of party supporters also
has substantive implications: It may mean that public pre-
ferences regarding these specific policy issues are not
related (strongly) to the ideological preferences of voters
(see also Lesschaeve, 2017) and that parties often do not
have to choose between their supporters and the general
public.
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Analysis
Table 2 presents the results of a series of models that pre-
dict whether a political party supports a policy proposal.
Model 1 directly assesses the relationship between public
preferences and party positions outlined in Hypothesis 1,
which is in the expected direction and significant: the
higher the public support for an issue, the higher the chance
that a political party supports it.
The interaction effects between public preferences and
nicheness in Models 3 and 5 show that contrary to Hypoth-
esis 2A (mainstream parties’ positions are more likely to be
positively related to the preferences of the general public
than those of a niche party), the effect of public opinion on
the position of a party is stronger for parties emphasizing
niche issues than for parties focusing on mainstream topics.
The effect disappears once the interaction between public
preferences and government parties is included in Model 5,
however. Online Appendix 3 shows similar results for the
relationship between the preferences of party supporters
and party positions. This provides some evidence for
Hypothesis 2B that the positions of parties with niche issue
profiles are more strongly related to the preferences of their
supporters than those of parties with mainstream issue pro-
files. Again, the effect disappears once the interaction with
government status is included. Taken together, these results
provide little evidence for the expectation that niche parties
respond to their supporters and mainstream parties to the
general public. If anything, the evidence suggests that the
positions of parties with more niche issue profiles are more
likely to be related to the preferences of the general public
and those of supporters, which may be due to the fact that
niche parties are also more often opposition parties.
Models 3–5 in Table 2 show that the difference between
government and opposition parties is much more pro-
nounced, however. The interaction between government
status and public support for an issue is negative and sig-
nificant in both Models 3 and 5, indicating that the policy
Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a party was in favor of a policy issue.
Effect Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Public support 1.82*** (0.55) 1.85*** (0.55) 2.14 (1.69) 3.96*** (0.89) 2.22 (2.38)
Nicheness 2.80* (1.34) 0.88 (2.00) 3.03* (1.39) 1.59 (2.29)
Public support  Nicheness 7.09* (2.90) 2.65 (3.40)
Government party 0.55 (0.49) 0.55 (0.49) 2.63*** (0.77) 2.38** (0.82)
Public support  Government party 4.28*** (1.19) 3.79** (1.33)
Controls
Party (Ref: SPD)
CDU/CSU 0.04 (0.43) 1.02 (0.64) 0.96 (0.65) 1.15þ (0.66) 1.12þ (0.66)
FDP 0.49 (0.98) 0.47 (0.99) 0.44 (1.00) 0.20 (1.07) 0.21 (1.06)
Gru¨ne 0.29 (1.05) 0.44 (1.09) 0.44 (1.10) 0.20 (1.19) 0.22 (1.18)
Linke 0.19 (1.02) 0.48 (1.06) 0.49 (1.07) 0.22 (1.15) 0.25 (1.14)
Party size 0.00 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Media salience 0.10 (0.33) 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.33) 0.08 (0.34) 0.09 (0.34)
Constant 1.25 (1.28) 2.79þ (1.52) 0.71 (1.75) 4.44* (1.74) 3.46 (2.12)
Coalition fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Policy level random intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of cases 334 334 334 334 334
AIC 460 457 455 446 448
BIC 510 510 516 507 513
þp < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Table 1. Overview of variables.
Variable Values Range Mean (SD) Description
Party position 0, 1 0–1 0.52 (0.50) Dependent variable: party position on an issue
Public support 0–1 0.06–0.97 0.52 (0.22) Proportion of public in favor of policy change
Party support 0–1 0–0.98 0.52 (0.24) Proportion of party supporters in favor of policy change
Nicheness 0–2 0.12–0.88 0.31 (0.46) Degree of nicheness of a political party
Government party 0–1 0.47 (0.50) Whether party is in government (1) or not (0)
Party 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1–5 Identifies each political party
Party size 0–100 4–41.5 22.02 (13.73) Percentage of seats in the Bundestag
Media salience 0–1 0.002–2.46 0.200 (0.35) Average number of articles on the issue per day
Coalition 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1–5 Whether a party is a member of a specific coalition
Romeijn 7
positions of parties in government are generally less related
to public opinion than those of opposition parties, in line
with Hypothesis 3A. Based on Model 5, an increase in
public support for a policy proposal from 40% to 70%
raises the probability of an opposition party supporting the
policy from 36% to 56%. The same increase in public
support does not change the probability that a government
party is in favor of a policy issue.
To demonstrate this, Figure 1 plots the probability of a
party supporting a policy issue at different levels of public
support. In a scenario where party positions are tightly
linked to public opinion, the likelihood of being in favor
of a policy increases as public support rises and increases
most sharply around the 50% mark, from which point a
majority of the public is in favor of the policy change. The
figure shows that, at least when it comes to the statements
in the media, German opposition parties (red, dashed line)
are close to this “ideal” linkage. However, once they are in
government (black, solid line), the relationship between
public support and party positions flattens. This suggests
that while political parties may aim to make statements
about policy issues that are popular, they weigh other inter-
ests much more strongly once the constraints of being in
government are in place. To the extent that these govern-
ment parties are also much more likely to get their way and
decide whether a policy change is enacted, this may nega-
tively affect the link between public opinion and policy.
The negative interaction in the results table in Online
Appendix 3 that is plotted in the figure in Online Appendix
4 shows a similar result regarding Hypothesis 3B that the
positions of government parties are also less related to the
preferences of their supporters than those of opposition
parties. The main difference is that whereas the positions
of government parties are unrelated to public preferences,
they remain related to those of their supporters (but more
weakly so than the positions of opposition parties). This
may indicate that when political parties are constrained by
being in government, they choose to align with their sup-
porters more than with the general public. The finding ties
in with previous studies of statements by coalition parties in
several countries, who argue that these parties also use
parliamentary debates to flag responsiveness to their sup-
porters (Martin and Vanberg, 2008).
Assessing the results and robustness. To better understand
whether (government) parties indeed follow their support-
ers when facing constraints (and following the logic of
Branham et al., 2017), we can consider only those 38 cases,
or about 10% of the total, where the majority of the public
and party supporters support different sides of the issue.9 In
Figure 1. Predicted probability of a position in favor of a policy issue for government parties and opposition parties (left axis) and the
distribution of cases (right axis). The black solid line indicates the predictions for government parties and the red dashed line for
opposition parties with 95% confidence intervals, based on Model 5 in Table 1. The shaded gray area indicates the distribution of the
cases (as a percentage of the total N) across public support (right axis).
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these cases, parties side with their supporters 84% of the
time. An example is the position of the CDU/CSU regard-
ing increasing the rights of registered same-sex couples.
The supporters of the party were against this policy, while
the general public supported it. The party took a position
against extending the rights of registered same-sex cou-
ples.10 Although based on a limited number of cases, this
supports the inference that when faced with the choice
between the preferences of the general public and those
of their supporters, political parties choose the position of
their supporters most of the time.
In addition, a number of alternative specifications and
robustness checks were run to validate the results. Online
Appendix 6 demonstrates that the results for niche and
mainstream parties remain when issue ownership is taken
into account (Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014; Klu¨ver and
Spoon, 2016). It also explores the effect of media salience
on the relationship between public preferences and party
positions. Online Appendix 6, Table 6.1 presents that the
results stay the same when taking congruence (whether the
majority of the public and the position of a political party
are on the same side of an issue) as an alternative dependent
variable. Online Appendix 6, Table 6.2 then shows that the
results are robust to the exclusion of each political party.11
Conclusion
This article used a novel application of MRP to study the
representation of the public through political parties on
specific policy proposals in Germany to explore whether
niche and opposition parties incorporate public preferences
differently than mainstream and government parties,
respectively. The study finds little evidence for the expec-
tation that the positions of parties with more niche issue
profiles are more related to their supporters’ positions and
parties with mainstream issue profiles more strongly linked
to the general public’s. Given that these results differ from
those found in other studies (e.g. Adams et al., 2006), it
should be noted that the conclusions in this article are based
on a comparison across a limited set of political parties.12
Although this article used a more dynamic conceptualiza-
tion of nicheness within parties (Bischof, 2017a), more
comparative work on specific policy issues is needed to
draw definitive conclusions.
That being said, this article was the first to show that
parties in opposition are very effective in taking policy
positions that are popular with the public. Yet once they
are in government, the relationship with general public
opinion disappears, whereas the link with supporters’ pre-
ferences weakens. The idea that political parties tend to
take positions in line with what their supporters want when
put under pressure is further underlined by the finding that
when the public and a party’s supporters disagree on an
issue, parties take the side of their supporters 84% of the
time. While mainly considering the preferences of one’s
constituency is not problematic for representation, it might
become more problematic if, at this stage, the link between
general public opinion and final policy outcomes is severed
since government parties probably have a much stronger
impact on policy outcomes.
Of course, the weakened linkage for government parties
may also be a reflection of the need for parties in coalition
governments to take the preferences of their coalition part-
ners into account. Moreover, opposition parties may be bet-
ter placed to avoid making statements in the media when
they have an unpopular position on a policy issue than gov-
ernment parties, which could somewhat affect the results
(Green Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; see also Online
Appendix 5). Future studies could compare the German case
to a country with single-party coalitions or adopt other mea-
sures of party positions to rule out a media effect.
Although this study included controls for political parties
and the results were not reliant on any one specific political
party (see Table 6.2 in Online Appendix 6), the inferences in
this study are based on a limited number of parties. While the
chosen approach enabled studying a large number of policy
issues, it limits the extent to which inferences can be drawn
across political parties. Future comparative work taking a
similar approach could study other party characteristics such
as whether ideologically extreme parties act differently than
more moderate parties.
Still, the study demonstrates the added value of studying
the positions of political parties on specific issues. The
finding that on these issues, the general public and the
supporters of a political party often want the same thing
is important. It means that on most specific policy issues
the supporters of a party agree with the general public and
that political parties do not face a choice between the two
and that studies using ideological dimensions miss part of
the story (see also Lesschaeve, 2017).
This study has pinpointed at least one potential point in the
chain from the public to policy where the link between public
preferences and policy outcomes may be weakened and has
shown that studying representation through political parties
on specific policy issues is possible and canhelp generate new
insights into the study of political representation.
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Notes
1. For a review, see Fagerholm (2015).
2. Lax and Phillips (2012) define this as “responsiveness.” To
avoid confusion and the causal implications of the term, this
study calls this the public opinion–party position linkage
instead.
3. For some issues, the proportion of respondents who answered
“don’t know” is high. The results from the article are robust to
excluding issues where more than 10% of respondents
answered “don’t know.”
4. This only included statements by national party leaders,
spokespeople on the issue in the Bundestag, and cabinet
members. Statements by local, European Union, and Bundes-
rat politicians were excluded as they are subject to somewhat
different electoral pressures (Ba¨ck, Debus, & Klu¨ver, 2016).
If no statements were found, student coders also looked at
other broadsheet newspapers and reports from television sta-
tions ARD and ZDF.
5. For example, a 40- to 50-year-old woman with a university
degree voted for the CDU.
6. Rerunning the models with only those who scored 4 (rather
strong) or 5 (strong) on this variable did not change the
estimates substantially. Online Appendix 1 contains the exact
questions.
7. The observations may also be clustered in party–coalition
combinations. Running the models with fixed effects for
these combinations does not change the results.
8. The preferences of the supporters of SPD, FDP, and CDU/
CSU correlate strongest with general public opinion (>0.9),
but correlations are also >0.7 for Die Gru¨ne and Die Linke.
9. Online Appendix 7 indicates which parties faced this situa-
tion on which policy issues.
10. In 2017 (after the observation period) the party did allow a
vote on the introduction of opening marriages to same-sex
couples, but only after a majority of its voters also supported
the issue.
11. The results also do not change substantively when controls
for political parties are not included in the models.
12. The models (not shown) were rerun using the dichotomous
definition used by Adams et al. (2006), according to which
Die Linke and Die Gru¨ne were classified as niche parties.
This did not change the results substantively.
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